It's Raining Cats or Dogs? Adversarial Rain Attack on DNN Perception by Zhai, Liming et al.
It’s Raining Cats or Dogs? Adversarial Rain Attack on DNN Perception
Liming Zhai1, Felix Juefei-Xu2, Qing Guo3∗, Xiaofei Xie3, Lei Ma4,
Wei Feng5, Shengchao Qin6, Yang Liu3
1Wuhan University, China 2Alibaba Group, USA 3Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
4Kyushu University, Japan 5Tianjin University, China 6Teesside University, UK
Abstract
Rain is a common phenomenon in nature and an essential
factor for many deep neural network (DNN) based percep-
tion systems. Rain can often post inevitable threats that must
be carefully addressed especially in the context of safety-
and security-sensitive scenarios (e.g., autonomous driving).
Therefore, a comprehensive investigation of the potential
risks of the rain to a DNN is of great importance. Unfortu-
nately, in practice, it is often rather difficult to collect or syn-
thesize rainy images that can represent all raining situations
that possibly occur in the real world. To this end, in this paper,
we start from a new perspective and propose to combine two
totally different studies, i.e., rainy image synthesis and ad-
versarial attack. We present an adversarial rain attack, with
which we could simulate various rainy situations with the
guidance of deployed DNNs and reveal the potential threat
factors that can be brought by rain, helping to develop more
rain-robust DNNs. In particular, we propose a factor-aware
rain generation that simulates rain steaks according to the
camera exposure process and models the learnable rain fac-
tors for adversarial attack. With this generator, we further pro-
pose the adversarial rain attack against the image classifica-
tion and object detection, where the rain factors are guided by
the various DNNs. As a result, it enables to comprehensively
study the impacts of the rain factors to DNNs. Our large-
scale evaluation on three datasets, i.e., NeurIPS’17 DEV, MS
COCO and KITTI, demonstrates that our synthesized rainy
images can not only present visually realistic appearances,
but also exhibit strong adversarial capability, which builds the
foundation for further rain-robust perception studies.
1 Introduction
Rain is condensed aqueous vapor in the form of falling drops
with high speeds and small sizes. As a common weather
phenomenon, rain can bring massive impacts not only on
our human society, but also significant influences on today’s
intelligent era. Such impacts are most prominent in deep
neural network (DNN) based perception systems, e.g., au-
tonomous driving, video surveillance and unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV), which can be easily disturbed by the in-
evitable rain effects, suffering from severe safety and secu-
rity issues (Zhang et al. 2018; Bahnsen and Moeslund 2018).
Therefore, it is of great importance and pressing to compre-
hensively study how the rain affects the DNNs.
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Figure 1: Illustration of clean images (left) and adversarial rain ex-
amples (right). First row: images from NeurIPS’17 DEV dataset
with image classifier Inception v3 (Szegedy et al. 2016). Second
row: images from MS COCO dataset with object detector Faster-
RCNN (Ren et al. 2015).
The rain effect in images to DNNs has something in com-
mon with adversarial examples (Akhtar and Mian 2018;
Yuan et al. 2019).In particular, rain can also mislead the
DNNs as if by adding minor rain noises (i.e., some non-
trivial perturbation) to benign samples under some con-
straints. For image samples, the adversarial perturbations
are actually controllable artificial noises superimposed on
images. However, rain often has various appearances de-
termined by weather conditions and environment lighting,
and further undergoes visual changes presented in rainy im-
ages due to varying camera parameters (Garg and Nayar
2007). While existing rain rendering methods can to some
extent generate rainy images, they are mostly used for a spe-
cific scenario (Garg and Nayar 2006; Rousseau, Jolivet, and
Ghazanfarpour 2006; Creus and Patow 2013; Weber et al.
2015; Halder, Lalonde, and Charette 2019). Therefore, it is
challenging or even impossible to collect or synthesize rainy
images in all kinds of rain situations that can potentially oc-
cur in the real world.
In this paper, we intend to tackle this problem from a
new angle, by taking a combined perspective of two differ-
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ent studies, i.e., rainy image synthesis and adversarial at-
tack, and present an adversarial rain attack, by which we
could simulate various (potentially worst-case) rainy situ-
ations with the guidance of deployed DNNs, to reveal the
potential common threat factors of rain. Our adversarial rain
attack takes both adversarial capability and rain appearance
quality into consideration. The adversarial rain is made in-
tentionally visible, which is completely opposite to the im-
perceptible adversarial noises, thus the adversarial ability
has to be achieved with stronger constraints. For this pur-
pose, we design a factor-aware rain generation method that
simulates rain steaks following the camera exposure pro-
cess. In addition, we also model several types of controllable
rain factors, including rain intensity, rain direction, and rain
brightness, all of which can be learned and tuned for adver-
sarial attack under the constraints of rain appearance. After
generating the rain streaks, we perform a composition of the
rainy images by using rain synthesis models.
We conduct a large-scale evaluation of our adversarial
rain attack on the state-of-the-art DNN-based image classi-
fiers and object detectors, to demonstrate the effectiveness of
our technique. We find that, indeed, our technique can suc-
cessfully generate adversarial rain images with high-quality
(see some examples in Figure 1). Our learned rain factors
can also be used to guide the generation of real adversarial
rain examples, demonstrating the potential threats of natural
rain that should be called attention in future studies.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We identify the essential problem of the inevitable rain
factors to the impacts and risks of DNNs. With a com-
prehensive study on the relation of rain effect and DNN,
we propose a new type of adversarial attack by using com-
mon rainy weather rather than adversarial noises. The pro-
posed adversarial rain enriches the current family of ad-
versarial examples, in providing an important family of
physical effects that can occur in the real world.
• We design a novel rain generation method that can synthe-
size both photo-realistic rain images, which also exhibits
strong DNN attack capability, helping to analyze the risks
of rain effects to a DNN.
• Furthermore, we also propose techniques to synthesize
the more rains, which is more close to the real-world
rains, which is significantly different from the traditional
rain rendering methods.
• We perform a large scale evaluation and demonstrate the
effectiveness of our adversarial rain attack in terms of at-
tack success rate and transferability even under the state-
of-the-art de-raining methods.
2 Related Work
2.1 Adversarial Noise Attacks
Extensive studies have shown that state-of-the-art DNNs are
still vulnerable to adversarial examples (Yuan et al. 2019).
In their early study, (Szegedy et al. 2014) demonstrated
that intentionally designed perturbations added to images
can mislead classification results, and proposed to generate
adversarial examples by using a box-constrained L-BFGS
method. To overcome the high complexity in (Szegedy et al.
2014), (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015) designed
a fast gradient sign method (FGSM) to produce adversar-
ial noises with the sign of loss gradient in a one-step pro-
cess. Since then, numerous gradient-based adversarial noise
attacks for image classification have been proposed, includ-
ing the attacks by developing the FGSM in multiple itera-
tions (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2017; Carlini and
Wagner 2017; Madry et al. 2018), integrating momentum
iteratively into FGSM (MI-FGSM) (Dong et al. 2018), em-
ploying diverse input method (DIM) in each iteration (Xie
et al. 2019a) and optimizing perturbations with a translation-
invariant method (TIM) (Dong et al. 2019).
Recently, adversarial examples are also applied to other
computer vision tasks. (Xie et al. 2017) proposed a dense
adversary generation (DAG) algorithm to attack object de-
tection and semantic segmentation models, in which the loss
of object proposals with assigned false labels was minimized
during gradient-descent iterations. (Li et al. 2018) sug-
gested attacking the region proposal network (RPN) widely
adopted in object detectors, and designed a robust adversar-
ial perturbation (RAP) method. (Wang et al. 2020b) gen-
erated adversarial examples by using the total loss of both
object detector and RPN. Differently, (Wei et al. 2019) pro-
posed a unified and efficient adversary (UEA) method for
image and video object detection based on generative adver-
sarial network (GAN), and achieved high transferability and
low computation cost. Moreover, recent studies also explore
physical adversarial attacks against real-world object detec-
tors (Chen et al. 2018; Huang et al. 2020).
The current adversarial attacks are mainly performed un-
der the disguise of noises and some other image manipu-
lations (Wang et al. 2020a; Cheng et al. 2020a; Guo et al.
2020b), all of which are artificial fabrications and may be
suspicious to human eyes. We instead use common rainy
weather as a natural camouflage for launching adversarial
attacks.
2.2 Rain Rendering
Rain rendering refers to the generation or synthesis of photo-
realistic rain effects in computer graphics. Existing rain ren-
dering methods can roughly fall into two categories. The
first category simulates the texture patterns of rain streaks,
and post-processes the rain streaks to fit the scene (Wang
and Wade 2004; Wang et al. 2006; Tatarchuk 2006). Such
methods are often simple and computationally efficient, but
lack of realistic rain appearance. The second category lever-
ages particle systems, in which the rain rate, rain distribu-
tion, and rain velocity can be flexibly controlled (Garg and
Nayar 2006; Rousseau, Jolivet, and Ghazanfarpour 2006;
Creus and Patow 2013; Weber et al. 2015; Halder, Lalonde,
and Charette 2019). In particular, these methods consider the
physical and optical properties of rain, being able to generate
visually realistic rain effects, but at expense of high compu-
tation costs.
Different from the above texture-based and physics-based
rain rendering methods, we generate the rain directly from
random noises with the guidance of DNNs, ensuring both
high rain realism and low computation complexity.
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Figure 2: Overview of factor-aware rain generation. Please zoom in for noise and rain details.
2.3 Rain Removal
Single image rain removal is the opposite of rain render-
ing, and the rain removal methods can also be largely di-
vided into two categories (Yang et al. 2020). The first cat-
egory is model-based methods, regarding the single image
rain removal as an image decomposition or signal separation
problem between the rain layer and background layer. Typi-
cal methods includes dictionary-based sparse coding (Kang,
Lin, and Fu 2011; Luo, Xu, and Ji 2015), nonlocal mean
filtering (Kim et al. 2013), low rank representation model
(Chen and Hsu 2013; Chang, Yan, and Zhong 2017), and
patch-based Gaussian mixture model (Li et al. 2016).
The second category is the recently fast-growing deep
learning-based method, which automatically learns a non-
linear mapping between rainy images and clean images.
Many DNN architectures have been proposed for de-raining.
Some representative methods include deep detail network
for predicting rain residues (Fu et al. 2017), multi-stream
dense network for rain density estimation and rain removal
(Zhang and Patel 2018), multi-task network for joint rain
detection and removal (Yang et al. 2017), and scale-free net-
work for two-stage de-raining (Yang et al. 2019). Further-
more, some recent attempts are also made by using GANs
for the de-raining task (Zhang, Sindagi, and Patel 2019; Qian
et al. 2018; Li, Cheong, and Tan 2019).
The existing de-raining methods are applied to real rain or
artificially synthesized rain. In experimental section, we use
rain removal to evaluate the survivability of our adversarial
rain, whose generation is guided by DNNs.
3 Methodology
In this section, we first introduce the factor-aware rain gen-
eration, which synthesizes the rainy images to be prepared
for adversarial attack. Next, we detail the implementation
of adversarial rain attack on image classification and object
detection tasks.
3.1 Factor-aware Rain Generation
Natural rain is liquid water that falls visibly in small drops.
Due to the high speeds of drops and the exposure time lim-
itation of a camera, the rain in an image can usually be
motion-blurred and displayed as longer streaks (Garg and
Nayar 2007). The latest rain rendering methods (Halder,
Lalonde, and Charette 2019; Creus and Patow 2013) are
mostly based on a ready-made rain streak database (Garg
and Nayar 2006) and/or a particle simulator, requiring strict
operating conditions. We instead propose a new mechanism,
named factor-aware rain generation, to generate photo-
realistic rain streaks (see Figure 2). We directly leverage
random noises as a starting point to generate rain streaks,
by taking the following consideration.
• A raindrop typically has a diameter of 1-2 mm, and usu-
ally does not exceed 10 mm (Garg and Nayar 2007;
Van Boxel 1997). The tiny raindrops in a far distance
captured by the camera look like image noises. Some de-
raining methods also treat the raindrops or rain streaks in
images as special high-frequency noises (Chang, Yan, and
Zhong 2017; Eigen, Krishnan, and Fergus 2013). These
are important physical rain properties and should be con-
sidered during method design for better photo-realisticity.
• Many synthesized rain databases commonly adopt ran-
dom noises as the basis (Fu et al. 2017; Zhang and Patel
2018), which can be an effective starting point.
• Random noises can be easily modulated during gradient
back-propagation, which provides the chance and effi-
cient way for the combination investigation of worst-case
rain effects to the decision of DNNs.
To generate realistic looking rain from random noises,
some properties of noises, including noise distribution, noise
strength and noise density, should be carefully considered.
The random noises are generated from a uniform distribu-
tion U(a, b) and form a noise image with the same size as the
input clean image. Since the rain streak usually has larger in-
tensities, the lower bound a and upper bound b of U(a, b) are
assigned large values (see experimental section). The noise
image is then uniformly sampled using a sampling rate εn
by setting the non-selected elements zero, thus obtaining a
sparse noise image. The sampling rate εn is the ratio of the
desired number of noise elements to the image size, and it
determines the noise density of a noise image, and also af-
fects the rain rate in the final rainy image. The reason behind
the uniform sampling is that the distribution of drops is uni-
form over space and time (Garg and Nayar 2007).
Inspired by the formation of rain streaks in camera sens-
ing process, we simulate the motion-blur of the noise image
as the rain effects. Since the motion-blur is an integration of
the positions of moving objects over the period of exposure
time, the motion-blur of the noise image can be simulated
by continuous translation along a specific direction.
Let N be a noise image, and Tθ the translation transfor-
mation with translation parameters θ. The transformed noise
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image is denoted as NTθ . The Tθ can be performed by us-
ing a spatial transformer network (Jaderberg et al. 2015),
and thus θ represents affine matrix parameters. To trans-
form the noises into continuous rain streaks, we further di-
vide the translation transformation process into N parts. To
this end, we apply a N -step translation transformation toN
using translation parameters i∆θ, where ∆θ = θ/N and
i ∈ [0, N ]. After the N -step translation transformation, we
obtain N transformed noise images NTi∆θ . To smooth the
rain streak formed by summing up N transformed noise im-
ages, we convolve the N transformed noise images with a
mean filter kernelKp with size (N+1)×C×1×1, whereC
is the number of color channels. Finally, the p-th rain streak
Rp is generated by
Rp = g(Np, Tθ,Kp) =
∑
i,q∈[0,N ]
NTi∆θp kpq (1)
where Np is the p-th noise element in N, Kp is the kernel
corresponding to Np, and kpq is the q-th weight of Kp. All
theRp make up a rain layerR.
Given a clean image X and a rain layer R, the rainy im-
ageX′ can be synthesized by various rain synthesis models.
Take the additive composite model (Yang et al. 2020) as an
example, the rainy image synthesis is formulated as
X′ = h(X,R) = X+R (2)
where h(X,R) represents a synthesis function.
Note that, in this initial attempt, we have not yet consid-
ered the environmental lighting for rain generation, and we
consider a simple scenario where the rain streaks are thin
enough to neglect the reflection and refraction of light. More
complicated and advanced can be integrated into our rain
generation process (Garg and Nayar 2007; Halder, Lalonde,
and Charette 2019) as future work.
The factor-aware rain generation method just provides ini-
tial rainy images, which still lack of adversarial ability. In
the following two subsections, we use the DNNs deployed
in image classification and object detection to further guide
the rain factors for producing adversarial rainy images.
3.2 Adversarial Rain Attack on Image
Classification
Given a classifier f(X) : X ∈ X → y ∈ Y that maps an in-
put imageX to a ground-truth class label y. The adversarial
attack aims to generate a constrained example X′ that can
mislead f(X′) to output a false label, usually by maximiz-
ing the loss L(X′, y).
In conventional adversarial noise attacks, the adversar-
ial example X′ is typically generated by adding adversar-
ial noises to X. For our adversarial rain attack, we gener-
ate X′ by using the rain generation (Eq. (1)) and rain syn-
thesis model (Eq. (2)). To enable successful adversarial at-
tacks of rainy images for image classification, we need to
optimize the rain factors under the constraint of rain ap-
pearance. There are three types of rain factors should be
considered: noise N, translation parameters θ and kernels
K = {Kp|p ∈ [1, ‖N‖0]}. The N affects the rain intensity,
θ controls the direction of rain streaks, and K determines
the brightness and smoothness of rain streaks. The adversar-
ial rainy images can be generated by solving the following
constrained optimization problem:
arg max
N, θ,K
L(h(Xp,
∑
i,q∈[0,N ]
NTi∆θp kpq), y) (3)
s.t. ∀p, ‖N‖0 ≤ εnM, θ ≤ εθ, kpq ≤ εk (4)
where M is the number of the pixels in a clean image, and
εθ and εk denote the thresholds for θ and kpq . For natural
rain, the rain streaks often exhibit certain ranges of inten-
sity (relevant to rain rate), directions (affected by wind) and
brightness (depending on environment lighting and camera
settings).N, θ and kpq are used to curb the rain factors to en-
sure realistic looking rain. The values of εn, θ and kpq will
be elaborated in the experimental section.
During the rain generation process, we can calculate the
gradient of the loss function w.r.t. all rain factors, and tune
the rain factors along a gradient ascent direction for adver-
sarial attacking. Therefore, the adversarial rain attack can
be integrated into current existing gradient based adversar-
ial noise attack framework, such as FGSM (Goodfellow,
Shlens, and Szegedy 2015), MI-FGSM (Dong et al. 2018),
DIM (Xie et al. 2019a) and TIM (Dong et al. 2019), etc.
Algorithm 1 presents the details of our adversarial rain at-
tack for image classification tasks. In particular, each itera-
tion generates a loss, a rain layer and a rainy image. Eventu-
ally, only the rainy image with the largest loss in S iterations
is selected as the final adversarial rainy image.
3.3 Adversarial Rain Attack on Object Detection
In this section, we further extend our adversarial rain at-
tack to the object detection task. Given an object detector
f(X) : X ∈ X → t ∈ T that maps an input image X to
a recognition target t. The t can be of any intermediate out-
puts or final outputs of a detector, not limited to the class
labels (Xie et al. 2017), such as final bounding-boxes (Wang
et al. 2020b), confidence scores and bounding-boxes of the
object proposals in an RPN (Li et al. 2018). All these types
of targets can be utilized to generate constrained adversarial
examples X′ to fool f(X′), in producing wrong detection
results. This process can be accomplished by minimizing the
loss L(X′, T ′), where T ′ is a set of one type of adversarial
targets t′.
Similar to the image classification task, the adversarial
rainy images for object detection can be generated by
arg min
N, θ,K
∑
j
Lj(h(Xp,
∑
i,q∈[0,N ]
NTi∆θp kpq), Tj ′)
s.t. ∀p, ‖N‖0 ≤ εnM, θ ≤ εθ, kpq ≤ εk
(5)
where j is the index of adversarial target types (e.g., class
labels, bounding-boxes, or confidence scores). One or more
types of adversarial target set Tj ′ can be considered for the
total loss function, in which Lj denotes the loss function
corresponding to Tj ′.
Similarly, we can tune the rain factors via a gradient de-
scent algorithm, and also apply the adversarial rain attack
to current gradient based adversarial noise attacks for object
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Algorithm 1: Adversarial Rain Attack
Input: Clean imageX, classifier f with loss function L, rain
factorsN, θ and K
Output: Adversarial rainy imageX′
1 InitializeX(1)=X, θ(1)=θ, K(1)=K, Lmin=+∞;
2 for s = 1, · · · , S do
3 Generate a rain layerR(s) using θ(s) and K(s) based on
Eq. (1);
4 Synthesize a rainy imageX′(s) usingX(s) andR(s)
based on Eq. (2);
5 Get the loss L(X′(s), y) from f(X′(s)), and calculate the
gradient∇X′(s)L(X′(s), y) of L(X′(s), y) w.r.t.X′(s);
6 Back-propagate the sign of gradient∇X′(s)L(X′(s), y)
to the rain factors θ(s) and K(s), and update them as
θ(s+1) and K(s+1) using a gradient ascent method;
7 if L(X′(s), y) < Lmin then
8 Lmin = L(X
′
(s), y);
9 X′opt = X′(s);
10 returnX′ = X′opt;
detection, such as DAG (Xie et al. 2017) and RAP (Li et al.
2018), etc. The attacking algorithm for object detection is
similar to that of image classification, and we omit it here
due to the page limit.
4 Experiments
4.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our tech-
nique, we perform comprehensive evaluation of our adver-
sarial rain attack on two different tasks: image classifica-
tion and object detection. For image classification, we use
NeurIPS’17 adversarial competition dataset DEV (Kurakin
et al. 2018) for experiments, which consists of 1,000 images,
and is compatible with ImageNet. For object detection, we
perform experiments on MS COCO 2014 minival split (Lin
et al. 2014) and KITTI object benchmark (Geiger, Lenz, and
Urtasun 2012), which contain 5,000 images and 7,480 im-
ages, respectively.
Threat Models. To validate the effectiveness of the ad-
versarial rain attack on image classification, we exploit four
publicly-available pre-trained models, including Inception
v3 (Inc-v3) (Szegedy et al. 2016), Inception v4 (Inc-v4), In-
ception ResNet v2 (IncRes-v2) (Szegedy et al. 2017), and
Xception (Chollet 2017). The threat model for object detec-
tion is Faster RCNN (FR) (Ren et al. 2015) with different
backbones, including VGG16 (v16) (Simonyan and Zisser-
man 2014), MobileNet (mn) (Howard et al. 2017), ResNet50
(rn50), ResNet101 (rn101) and ResNet152 (rn152) (He et al.
2016).
Baselines. We compare the adversarial rain attack with six
adversarial noise attacks: FGSM (Goodfellow, Shlens, and
Szegedy 2015), MI-FGSM (Dong et al. 2018), DIM (Xie
et al. 2019a) and TIM’s three variants TI-FGSM, TI-MI-
FGSM, and TI-DIM (Dong et al. 2019). The comparative
methods used for objection detection are RAP (Li et al.
2018) and UEA (Wei et al. 2019), respectively.
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Figure 3: The effect of U(a, b) on adversarial capability.
Table 1: The effect of εn, εθ , and εk on adversarial capability.
εn 0.001 0.0025 0.005 0.0075 0.01 0.02
Success rate 81.5 90.3 98.6 99.4 99.8 99.9
εθ 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Success rate 85.4 92.2 96.0 98.6 99.2 9.5
εk 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Success rate 82.3 89.8 94.7 98.6 99.7 99.9
Evaluation Metrics. We use attack success rate and mean
average precision (mAP) as major metrics to measure the ad-
versarial ability on image classification and object detection,
respectively.
Implementation Details. To attack image classifiers and
object detectors, we individually generate adversarial rain
examples by integrating with MI-FGSM and RAP in 20 it-
erations, and adopt the default parameters suggested in MI-
FGSM and RAP.
4.2 Ablation Study
In this subsection, we first conduct ablation experiments to
study the impact of rain factors. When considering one rain
factor, the other rain factors are set as default values and re-
main unchanged. For simplicity, all the ablation experiments
are only performed on the image classification task.
As described in Section 3, the adversarial rain is gener-
ated from random noises that follow a normal distribution
U(a, b), and further optimized under the constraints related
to thresholds εn, εθ and εk. We first show in Figure 3 the ef-
fects of different combinations of lower bound a and upper
bound b in U(a, b) on the adversarial ability. We can observe
that the combinations of a and bwith larger values contribute
to a higher attack success rate due to larger noise strength. A
larger distribution interval increases noise diversity, and thus
enriches the texture pattern of rain appearance. Eventually,
we choose U(0.7, 1.0) as a suitable compromise.
The εn and εθ are scalar thresholds, while εk is a 2×1 vec-
tor containing thresholds for translation parameters in affine
transform. We report the effects of three types of thresholds
εn, εθ and εk on the adversarial ability in Table 1. We can see
that the adversarial rain attack achieves higher attack success
rates at larger εn, εθ and εk, indicating that higher rain inten-
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(a) AdvRain-DEV (ours) (b) AdvRain-COCO (ours)
(c) AdvRain-KITTI (ours)
(d) Rain100H (e) Rain800 (f) Rain1200
(g) Rain1400 (h) Physics-based Rain Rendering
Figure 4: Comparison of our adversarial rainy images on three datasets (a-c) and other synthesized rainy images from Rain100H (Yang et al.
2017), Rain800 (Zhang, Sindagi, and Patel 2019), Rain1200 (Zhang and Patel 2018), Rain1400 (Fu et al. 2017) and Physics-based Rain
Rendering (Halder, Lalonde, and Charette 2019) (d-h).
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Figure 5: User study of visual realism for different rainy images.
sity, longer rain streaks and brighter rain textures affect the
DNNs more severely. However, the adversarial ability satu-
rates at larger threshold values, which also degrades the rain
appearance. Therefore, we select εn = 0.005, εθ = 0.2 and
εk = 0.3 for following experiments.
4.3 Evaluation of Rain Appearance
Visual Effect. We compare the visual effect of our ad-
versarial rainy images with that of other synthesized rainy
images in Figure 4. We observe that our adversarial rainy
images show more realistic visual effects than the syn-
thesized rainy images in databases Rain100H (Yang et al.
2017), Rain800 (Zhang, Sindagi, and Patel 2019), Rain1200
(Zhang and Patel 2018) and Rain1400 (Fu et al. 2017),
which exhibit irregular rain directions or snow-like rain
streaks. In comparison with Figure 4 (c) and Figure 4 (h),
the physics-based rain (Halder, Lalonde, and Charette 2019)
produces relatively more realistic appearances than ours.
This is because the physics-based rainy images are synthe-
sized based on a physical particle system, a ready-made rain
database (Garg and Nayar 2006), and also use environmental
lighting for rain rendering. While our rainy images are gen-
erated directly from random noises, with which the adver-
sarial ability should also be taken into consideration. We be-
lieve the visual effect of our adversarial rainy images can be
further improved by employing lighting information, which
we leave as future work.
User study. We also conduct a user study to further eval-
uate the rain appearance following (Halder, Lalonde, and
Charette 2019). Specifically, we randomly select 10 images
from each rain database (i.e., our adversarial rainy images
and other five synthesized rain databases), in collecting a to-
tal of 60 rainy images. Then, we invite 30 participants (12
undergraduate students, 18 graduate students; 13 female, 17
male; aged 20 to 34) to rate the visual effect of rainy images
using a 5-points Likert scale. The results are summarized in
Figure 5. We can see that our adversarial rainy images and
physics-based rainy images obtain similar high voting scores
compared with other types of rainy images, confirming the
visual realism of our rain generation method.
4.4 Attacking Image Classification
We report the comparison results of different adversarial at-
tacks on image classification in Table 2. All adversarial at-
tack methods are targeted at Inc-v3 (white-box attack), and
also transferred to Inc-v4, IncRes-v2 and Xception (black-
box attack). For the white-box attack, the AdvRain (ad-
versarial rain attack) achieves the highest success rate than
all comparative methods. For the black-box attack, our Ad-
vRain always remains in the top three of the best performing
methods. The success rate of AdvRain is generally lower
than DIM and TI-DIM, this is because these two attack
methods were specifically designed for transferable adver-
sarial attack, and the AdvRain is integrated with MI-FGSM,
whose transferability is not as good as DIM and TI-DIM.
4.5 Attacking Object Detection
Table 3 and Table 4 summarize the performance of vari-
ous adversarial attack methods against object detection on
COCO and KITTI, respectively. For attack methods, we use
FR-v16 as a targeted model, and then perform the transfer
attack to FR-mn, FR-rn50, FR-rn101, and FR-rn152. For
COCO and KITTI dataset, the performance is measured by
mAP with IoU 0.7 and with the PASCAL criteria (Evering-
ham et al. 2010). As we can see in Table 3 and Table 4, the
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Table 2: The success rates (in %) of various adversarial attack
methods on NeurIPS’17 DEV.
Attack
Methods
Threat Models (Inc-v3)
Inc-v3 Inc-v4 IncRes-v2 Xception
FGSM 79.6 35.9 30.6 42.1
MI-FGSM 97.8 47.1 46.4 47.7
DIM 98.3 73.8 67.8 71.6
TI-FGSM 75.4 37.3 32.1 38.6
TI-MI-FGSM 97.9 52.4 47.9 44.6
TI-DIM 98.5 75.2 69.2 61.3
AdvRain 98.6 54.3 50.1 62.5
Table 3: The performance (mAP, in %) of various adversarial attack
methods on COCO.
Attack
Methods
Threat Models (FR-v16)
FR-v16 FR-mn FR-rn50 FR-rn101 FR-rn152
Clean 43.8 41.1 52.4 55.0 56.8
RAP 3.3 9.8 24.6 29.8 22.3
UEA 5.7 11.5 25.8 31.3 24.1
AdvRain 2.2 8.3 21.5 27.5 19.7
AdvRain consistently outperforms the RAP and UEA across
all cases. Specifically, when attacking the white-box model
FR-v16, the mAP score of FR-v16 drops significantly from
74.6% to 5.6%.
4.6 Qualitative comparisons
We illustrate the qualitative comparisons between the adver-
sarial examples of RAP, UEA and our AdvRain in Figure
6. For simplicity, we only compare the adversarial examples
using FR-v16 on COCO dataset in a white-box attack sce-
nario.
For the RAP, the adversarial noises are minimal pertur-
bations which are mostly concentrated in the object areas
to be detected. This type of small adversarial noises is de-
termined by the perception constraints in terms of PSNR.
However, the RAP still leaves perceptible artifacts appeared
in the smooth texture images (see the third and the fourth
rows in Figure 6 for RAP), implying that the conventional
adversarial noises are not applicable for all kinds of im-
ages. For the UEA, the adversarial noises are irregular lat-
ticed patterns, which are mainly located in object areas and
also scattered throughout the images. The noise pattern in
UEA is easily noticeable, and this is due to the generative
mechanism of UEA which uses a pix2pix GAN to generate
adversarial examples. Our adversarial rainy images are syn-
thesized by compositing learned rain layers and images in-
stead of directly adding noises to images, so they have high
visual realism.
4.7 Real-world Adversarial Rain Attack
The adversarial rain attack produces adversarial examples
by using the rain factors guided by DNNs. The rain fac-
tors, including rain noisesNp, translation parameters θ, and
kernels K, determine the adversarial capability of a spe-
cific rainy image. Therefore, a natural question arises, i.e.,
Table 4: The performance (mAP, in %) of various adversarial attack
methods on KITTI.
Attack
Methods
Threat Models (FR-v16)
FR-v16 FR-mn FR-rn50 FR-rn101 FR-rn152
Clean 74.6 72.3 75.8 78.1 78.4
RAP 8.7 17.5 20.4 23.1 23.9
UEA 10.3 21.6 23.2 25.0 26.3
AdvRain 5.6 11.8 15.4 17.8 18.2
Table 5: The performance (success rate for classification in the sec-
ond column and mAP for detection in the last two columns, in %)
of adversarial rain resistance to de-raining methods.
Methods Inc-v3-DEV FR-v16-COCO FR-v16-KITTI
Clean 0.5 43.8 74.6
AdvRain 98.6 2.2 5.6
AdvRain-GMM 33.2 26.9 56.4
AdvRain-DID-MDN 28.8 32.5 61.0
whether it is possible to use the obtained rain factors to ad-
just the appearance and dynamics of real rain so that to en-
able it to fool the DNNs. The resulting rain can be regarded
as a type of real-world adversarial rain attack, which is per-
formed in the following steps.
1) Fix the object to be classified or detected by DNNs, and
capture an image with a camera.
2) Generate the corresponding rainy image with our adver-
sarial rain attack, and also obtain the rain factor values.
3) Leverage the rain factors to adjust the rain to achieve ad-
versarial capability.
For this experiment, we perform a physical behavior study
in the real-world environment by our authors, using water-
drops from cans to emulate the real rain effects. In particular,
we spray the water by a watering can so that the water drops
are freely falling from a higher place. The desired rain inten-
sity (N) can be achieved by adjusting the amount of water
drops, and the rain directions (θ) are controlled by the wind
speed and wind direction of an electric fan. The kernels K
cannot be obtained in the real world, so we do not consider
adjusting the rain textures.
We use the Faster-RCNN to detect the clean image, adver-
sarial rainy image and real-world adversarial rainy image,
the results of which are summarized in Figure 7. We observe
that the two types of adversarial rainy images can both fool
the object detector, demonstrating that the rain factors can
be used as guidance for launching real-world adversarial at-
tacks. The appearances of two adversarial rainy images are
not very similar, but this problem can be adjusted by using
more sophisticated rain simulation equipment.
4.8 Resistance to De-raining Methods
De-raining methods can remove the rain streaks in images,
which can potentially be used for reducing the rain im-
pact on DNNs. In this section, we further evaluate the ef-
fects of our adversarial rain under a rain removal scenario.
Specifically, we use two types of de-raining methods, i.e.,
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Clean image RAP noise RAP image UEA noise UEA image Rain layer AdvRain image
Figure 6: Qualitative comparisons between RAP (Li et al. 2018), UEA (Wei et al. 2019) and our AdvRain. Please zoom in to see the details.
(a) Clean Image (b) AdvRain (c) Real AdvRain
Figure 7: Attack results in the real world.
GMM (model-based method) (Li et al. 2016) and DID-MDN
(deep learning-based method) (Zhang and Patel 2018), to re-
move our adversarial rain in rainy images on three datasets,
and then compare the adversarial ability before and after
de-raining. The results are summarized in Table 5, where
AdvRain-GMM and AdvRain-DID-MDN denote de-rained
adversarial rainy images. We can see that the AdvRain-
GMM and AdvRain-DID-MDN obtain lower success rate
or higher mAP scores than the original AdvRain, indicating
that the AdvRain is indeed affected by de-raining methods.
However, the AdvRain still preserves the adversarial capa-
bility to a different extent, which calls for more advanced
design of de-rain methods to reduce the potential impacts to
DNN decisions.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we perform a comprehensive study of the po-
tential risks of rain effect on DNN perception systems. We
propose a new type of adversarial rain attack, which simu-
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lates natural rain situations with the guidance of DNNs and
thus synthesizes visually realistic rainy images to mislead
image classification and object detection. The adversarial
rain attack reveals the essential and inevitable threat factors
of rain, which commonly exist in the real world. We con-
ducted extensive experiments to validate the effectiveness of
our adversarial rain attack on different datasets and tasks.
Our results show that the current state-of-the-art DNNs can
be vulnerable to the inevitable rain effects in the real-world,
which calls the attention to take rain effects into consider-
ation for more advanced design of real-world DNN-based
perception systems.
In future work, we would like to further optimize our ad-
versarial rain by considering lighting conditions and fog-like
rains, and also extend the adversarial rain attack to a more
broad range of applications, such as semantic segmentation
(Arnab, Miksik, and Torr 2018; Guo et al. 2018, 2017c) and
visual object tracking (Guo et al. 2020a,c, 2017a,b). More-
over, we will use our adversarial rain as a new kind of mu-
tation for DNN testing (Xie et al. 2019b; Ma et al. 2018;
Du et al. 2019; Xie et al. 2019c). The formulation of the
adversarial rain attack lies somewhere between traditional
additive noise attacks and purely non-additive-noise attacks
such as (Gao et al. 2020; Cheng et al. 2020b; Tian et al.
2020; Guo et al. 2020b). It will be worthwhile to further ex-
plore the interplay between the adversarial rain and other
mentioned adversarial attack modalities.
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